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STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant Carol

acting in

its

McCoy Brown

(“Carol”) appeals from the order of the District Court,

appellate capacity, afﬁrming the Magistrate’s denial 0f her Petition for an Elective

Share in Augmented Estate (the
(the “Decedent”).

“‘Petition”).

Carol

is

the surviving spouse of Michael Orion

Brown

Carol sought an increased award of the decedent’s estate Via an elective share

of the augmented estate—Which

is

comprised of a portion of the decedent’s quasi-community

property (property acquired while domiciled out of state and would be community property had

it

been acquired While domiciled in Idaho) and a portion of the surviving spouse’s quasi-community
property.

The

elective share statute is only available to a surviving spouse in limited circumstances.

For example, a surviving spouse only has an elective share claim

community
wealth in a

property.

if the

decedent owned quasi-

A decedent can only own quasi-community property if he 0r she

common law

state,

while married, but before being domiciled in Idaho. Once the

amount of the surviving spouse’s share of the augmented

estate is calculated,

it is

ﬁrst satisﬁed

property 0r wealth the surviving spouse receives upon the decedent’s death. Idaho
15-2-207.

The purpose of this

probate estate

Code

offset is t0 prevent the surviving spouse

When he or she has

section 15-2-202

acquired

Code

by

section

from electing a share of the

otherwise received a fair share 0fthe couple’s total wealth. Idaho

Comments

to Ofﬁcial Text.

“The surviving spouse

rather than the executor

0r the probate court has the burden 0f asserting an election, as well as the burden 0f proving the
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matters which must be

shown in order to make a successful claim to more than he 0r she has received.”

Idaho Code section 15-2-201,

Comment t0

Ofﬁcial Text.

The present proceeding concerns approximately $385,836.00

(the “Subject

the decedent set aside for his children and grandchildren in accounts payable

came from

that

that Carol

As

was

the his retirement and the sale of his separate real property.

entitled t0 a portion

The

a

community property claim

Petition argued

of those funds as part of the augmented estate of the decedent.

Court afﬁrmed the Magistrate’s decision. Additionally, pertinent 0n appeal,

B.

on death (“POD”)

will be discussed in greater detail below, the Magistrate denied the Petition

make

Funds”) that

at

and the

District

no time did Carol

t0 the Subject Funds.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Decedent worked

for the United States Forest Service

from 1960 0r 1961 through

his

retirement in 1995. R. p. 186. Other than inherited property, Which he sold in 2013 for $50,075.00,
the Decadent did not have

any other source of income. R.

in 1991. R. p. 186. Carol also

retirement in 201

When

1.

worked

The Decedent and Carol married

for the Forest Service for approximately

the Decedent retired, he

until her

began receiving retirement annuity payments from the

and the Decedent maintained separate bank accounts and a

bank account. R. 187. They each deposited money (Carol from her

his annuity) into their respective personal accounts. R. 187.

then contributed

29 years,

R. p. 187.

federal government. R. p. 187. Carol

joint

p. 186.

money 0n

From

salary, the

Decedent from

these personal accounts, each

a monthly basis t0 the joint account. R. p. 187. Despite having been

married t0 Carol for only 11.8% of the time the Decedent earned his retirement, he contributed
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$2,000 of his approximately $3,500 annuity beneﬁt each month to the joint account. R. pp. 191—
92.

From

the joint account, Carol and the Decedent paid bills, contributed to the household

expenses, and spent
the

money

as they

Wished as a couple. R.

money in their respective personal
During

including a

tractor.

their marriage,

home and

accounts as their

p. 187.

own

The Decadent and Carol

separate funds. R. p. 187.

Carol and the Decedent accumulated

real property in

McCall, multiple vehicles,

R. p. 187. The Decedent set up various

treated

many

trailers,

assets

0f value,

a horse barn, and a

POD bank accounts naming his adult children and

grandchildren as beneﬁciaries. R. p. 187. The Magistrate found that the only possible source for
the

money

POD

in the

accounts, other than the Decedent’s inherited property,

was

the retirement

annuity that the Decedent received each month from the federal government. R. p. 187. Over the
years, the

Decedent was able

grandchildren in these

t0 set aside the entirety

POD accounts.

R. p. 188.

The Decedent died 0n December 4, 20 1 6. R.
t0 Carol, [the

Decedent] did not leave a will.” R.

were distributed

to the

all

p. 188.

p. 188.

The Magistrate found that “[a]cc0rding

The Subject Funds

in the

POD

Decedent’s children (including the Respondents herein, Michael

and Dorraine Pool referred
entitlement to

0f the Subject Funds for his children and

to herein as the “‘Heirs”)

and grandchildren. R.

p. 188.

accounts

J.

Brown

Carol claimed

of the Subject Funds and brought the Petition for the purpose 0f acquiring the

Subj ect Funds.
C.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Carol was appointed as the personal representative of the Estate 0f Michael Orion

(the “Estate”), Carol

Brown

ﬁled her Petition contemporaneously With a temporary restraining order and
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a motion for preliminary injunction aimed at obtaining the Subject Funds. The preliminary
injunction was denied. After the Petition was filed, and before it was heard, Carol filed a Petition
for Restoration (the “Restoration Petition”) in which she attempted to have the Subject Funds
turned over to the Estate pursuant to the elective share statutes. The Magistrate denied Carol’s
Restoration Petition, making the preliminary finding that Carol’s elective share, if any, appeared
to be satisfied based upon the wealth Carol received. R. p. 161.
The Magistrate subsequently heard Carol’s Petition, which it also denied, based primarily
on Carol’s failure to meet her burden of proof on the threshold inquiry as to whether the Subject
Funds were quasi-community property. Carol appealed to District Court arguing that the
Magistrate Court (1) failed to “restore” the property to the Estate, (2) erred in denying Carol’s
elective share claim, and (3) erred in awarding discretionary costs.
On appeal before the District Court, Carol’s counsel was pointedly asked whether Carol
had proven the Subject Funds were quasi-community property to which counsel responded that
Carol was not claiming the Subject Funds were quasi-community property. The District Court
affirmed the Magistrate’s ruling, finding that the elective share does not encompass community
property and that Carol had failed to prove the Subject Funds were quasi-community property.
The District Court also awarded costs and fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. Carol
appeals the decision of the District Court.
Before this Court, Carol now alleges that the District Court erred by not applying the
community property presumption to quasi-community property (even though she represented on
intermediate appeal that she was not claiming the Subject Funds were quasi-community property).
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Additionally, Carol argues that the District Court erred

by not addressing her community property

claim (Which was not raised below).

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
The

Code

heirs should

be awarded costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to Idaho law, including Idaho

sections 12-121

and 15-8-208, and I.A.R. 40 and 41.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Idaho Supreme Court has described

the standard of review for appeals taken from a

district court sitting in its appellate capacity:

The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether
is substantial and competent evidence t0 support the magistrate's ﬁndings 0f
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those ﬁndings. If
those ﬁndings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the
district court afﬁrmed the magistrate's decision, we afﬁrm the district court's
decision as a matter 0f procedure. Thus, this Court does not review the magistrate
court's decision directly. Instead, we are procedurally bound t0 afﬁrm 0r reverse

there
fact

the district court's decision.

Campbell

v.

Parkway Surgery

Ctr.,

LLC, 158 Idaho 957, 354 P.3d 1172, 1176 (2015)

(internal

quotations and citations omitted).

A discretionary decision is reviewed for an abuse
18, 20,

43 P.3d 777, 779 (2002).

0f discretion. Hunt

v.

Hunt, 137 Idaho

A discretionary decision Will be upheld if the decision-making

court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries

0f its discretion;
available to

it;

(3) acted consistently

and

(4)

reached

its

With the legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices

decision

by the

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
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exercise 0f reason.”

Lunneborg

v.

My Fun Life,

ARGUMENT
As an initial matter, responding to Carol’s arguments 0n appeal is rendered somewhat difﬁcult
and confusing given

that

arguments made below.

many

either

(i)

(ii)

seek to avoid her actual

Additionally, Carol mischaracterizes the holdings of and supporting

authorities 0fthe Magistrate

and intermediate appellate

and the decisions 0f the Magistrate and
District Court’s reasoning for

Will ﬁrst

were not raised below 0r

District

Reviewing her actual arguments below

court.

Court resolves

awarding attorney fees under

this

confusion and illuminates the

I.C. 12-121.

summarize Carol’s arguments below and the lower

Accordingly, this section

courts’ decisions, then address Carol’s

arguments in the appropriate context.

1.

CAROL’S ARGUMENTS TO THIS COURT AVOID
ARGUED PRIOR TO THIS APPEAL.

WHAT SHE ACTUALLY

Throughout the proceedings before the Magistrate and on appeal before the

District Court,

Carol maintained that the elective share statutes encompass community property—an assertion
that is clearly inconsistent with the plain language

by

the District Court. This issue

However,

this issue

The

is

now

has direct bearing 0n

0f the elective share statutes and was rejected

notably absent from Carol’s

all

of Carol’s

listed issues

elective share statutes address limited situations

while domiciled out of state and where a surviving spouse

upon

the death of his or her spouse.

T0

ensure only a

fair

list

of issues on appeal.

0n appeal.

Where married couples acquire property

is left

share

is

without a

fair

share of said wealth

obtained by the surviving spouse,

several considerations are taken into account, including the decedent’s quasi-community property

(property obtained

by the decedent while domiciled
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outside of Idaho), the surviving spouse’s quasi-

community property, creating an augmented estate from this quasi-community property, and then
factoring in wealth the surviving spouse obtained from the decedent during life and at his death.
Accordingly, he elective share statutes address quasi-community property, an augmented estate
(which is comprised of quasi-community property), and an elective share thereto. The elective share
statutes do not address community property, as that is addressed elsewhere in Idaho Code. See Idaho
Code 15-2-102.
Carol has repeatedly misunderstood this concept. This began with her Petition, which invoked
the elective share statutes and referred to community property. See r. pp. 24–33. It persisted
throughout her subsequent filings, which need not be recited herein. It continued through trial on
Carol’s Petition where, in her opening statement, Carol asserted that the Subject Funds were
community property and therefore part of the augmented estate. Tr. pp. 23–24; 32–34. Carol did
not mention quasi-community property other than to state that the “quasi-community property
statutes have no purpose other than to provide that property that was acquired by a married couple
outside of the state is to be treated the same as community property.” See id, with specific quotation
from p. 34, ll. 10–14. Carol continued, “[t]his is a community property claim. And there’s no
distinction made between assets acquired outside of the state and within the state.”
At trial, Carol’s counsel stated, “Your Honor, it is not our intention today to present any
testimony. We intended to simply rest on the pleadings and the record in this case and submit our
case.” Tr. p. 15, ll 11–14. The Magistrate, apparently baffled by Carol’s position, attempted to gain
clarification and give Carol additional opportunity to prove her claim by demonstrating that the
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Subject Funds were quasi-community property, as required in order for Carol to utilize the elective
share statutes to make a claim thereto:
THE COURT: Okay. Do you believe you have a burden of providing what
is quasi-community property, when it was acquired, where it was acquired, those
sorts of things?
MR. O’BANNON: No Your Honor. It’s our position that there is no
meaningful distinction between quasi-community property and community
property.
THE COURT: So you don’t believe that you need to show me that the
property was quasi-community property because – well, just reading from 15-2201, quasi-community property is all personal property wherever situated and all
real property situated in this state which as heretofore been acquired or is hereafter
acquired by the decedent while domiciled elsewhere, and which would have been
the community property of the decedent and the surviving spouse had the decedent
been domiciled in this state, et cetera.
You don’t believe you have any need to show me this was property that
would have been community property had it been acquired here?
…
MR. O’BANNON: …And it’s our position that that is illogical, and that
there is no basis for making a distinction between property acquired outside of the
state and property acquired in the state.
THE COURT: …As to community property in Idaho, that’s divided – that’s
not divided today. That’s not what we do today. We’re just talking about the
augmented estate. So I – I mean, that’s how I’m understanding it.
But you see that differently?
MR. O’BANNON: Yes, Judge. We don’t see any distinction between it.
Quasi-community property is simply property that was acquired outside of Idaho
during the marriage…
If it was acquired outside of Idaho during the marriage, then it’s treated as
if it’s community property under Idaho law.
…
Tr. pp. 40–42. After this discussion the Court went so far as to tell Carol, while she still had time
to present evidence: “I think officially that you, as the petitioning party, have a burden to show me
what is quasi-community property in order for you to then have a 50 percent share in it.” Tr. p. 44,
ll. 21–25. Despite this specific direction from the trial, Carol presented no evidence as to the quasi-
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community property nature of the Subj ect Funds,
Funds were presumed
applies to

to

relying instead

0n her assertion

that the Subj ect

be community property and the mistaken belief that the elective share

community property.

Tr. p. 44,

11.

21-25, pp. 144-46.

The Magistrate ultimately denied Carol’s

Petition for the chief reason that Carol failed to

prove that the Subject Funds were quasi-community property, proof essential under the elective
share statutes. Speciﬁcally, in

Magistrate held that (1) Carol

and

its

Order Denying Petition For Elective Share (“Order”), the

made “n0

attempt” t0 prove what was quasi-community property,

(2) Carol “did nothing to counter the

these accounts

was

obvious fact that the only possible source of funding

[the Decedent’s] separate property.” R. p. 190.

While the analysis could have

simply ended therel, the Magistrate additionally held that (3) the Heirs proved that the source 0f

Funds was the Decedent’s separate retirement beneﬁts using Carol’s own testimony;

the Subject

(R. pp. 190—91); (4) the Decedent’s retirement

asserted; (R. p.

community; (R.
(R. p. 191);

augmented

and

191); (5) the

p.

was not

entirely

community property

Decadent contributed more than half 0f his retirement

191) (6) the community portion of the Decedent’s retirement

(7) that Carol

as Carol

had received

far

more than her

1/2

to the

was only 11.8%

share of the quasi-community

estate (R. p. 194).

Carol appealed t0 the District Court arguing that the elective share statutes apply t0

community property and

1

that she did not

have any burden

to

prove the character of the Subject

R. p. 190 (“While the analysis can simply end here, the Court Will address her other arguments.”).
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Funds because they were presumed to be community property. In her Reply Brief to the District
Court, Carol stated:
The Heirs’ argument rests almost entirely on their bold assertion that the
elective share statute has no application to community property. This assertion is
made as if it is an obvious fact, without any need to cite authority. The Heirs have
cited no case law in support of their assertion because none exists. They have
offered their own interpretation of the elective share statute, which they present as
settled law…
Idaho has a community property system. There is no separate “quasicommunity property” system. If the elective share statute has no application to
community property, it has no purpose at all….
What is really at issue in this case is not a purposeless distinction between
community property and quasi-community property…Carol has a community
property claim to the decedent’s accounts. The elective share statute appears to have
the purpose of allowing a surviving spouse to assert a claim against a decedent’s
estate for community property that was transferred out of a decedent’s estate
without her consent...
R. pp. 271–72.
Carol concluded her briefing to the District Court by stating: “[t]here is no existing
authority for the proposition that the elective share statute has no application to community
property claims.” R. pp. 281.
Before the District Court, Carol also took issue with how the Magistrate reached its
conclusion that that the Heirs had rebutted any presumption that the Subject Funds were
community property. The Magistrate reached this conclusion by evaluating all the testimony—
including Carol’s own testimony via testimony at trial and numerous verified pleadings. See R. p.
26, ¶¶ 13, 17–18; p. 27, ¶¶ 20, 24; p. 28, ¶ 28; pp. 30, 33 (verification), 75, 81 (verification); Tr.
pp. 50–51. Despite having relied upon these assertions earlier in the case (when Carol believed
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that her testimony regarding the source

0f the Subject Funds would work to her beneﬁt)2, Carol

argued t0 the District Court that the Magistrate could not rely 0n her testimony and veriﬁed
assertions because she “had

her statements regarding
the

ﬁmds.” R.

At

p.

no personal knowledge of the accounts and how they were funded, so

how

she believed they were funded were not evidence 0f the source of

278.

argument 0n intermediate appeal, Carol maintained focus on her community

oral

property argument and was elusive towards the District Court’s inquiries about quasi-community
property. See generally, Tr. pp. 3—4.

In the following colloquy With the Court, Carol

that she believed her elective share claim

THE COURT:

had nothing

property, d0 you agree
quasi-community property?

MR. O’BANNON:
show

that

it

do with quasi-community property:

...Now, in terms 0f whether any of this property

community

t0

to

I

that

made

your client failed t0 show that

is

quasi-

it’s,

quote,

don’t agree that our client had any duty 0r any burden

was quasi-community property.

THE COURT:
undertake to

Okay. And so is that the same thing as saying you didn’t
show that and did show it because you didn’t show that it was acquired

out of state?

MR. O’BANNON: We

didn’t believe that

it

was necessary

t0

show

that

it

was acquired out 0f state.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. O’BANNON: We
0f the

disagree With the Magistrate Court’s interpretation

statute.

THE COURT: You

disagree that that’s part 0f the deﬁnition of quasi-

community property, 0r that that’s

part 0f what

you were required t0 show t0 prove

entitlement to an elective share?

MR. O’BANNON: We disagree that it was part 0f the burden 0f proving an
elective share.

THE COURT:

A11 right.

And

so then

I

guess

I

want

with the very narrow question: Did you prove that

2

See R.

p. 75.
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to try

this

once more again

property

was

quasi-

clear

community property? I understand that you don’t think you had an obligation to do
that, but, hypothetically, if you did, did you carry that burden?
MR. O’BANNON: No, we do not claim that it was quasi-community
property.
Tr. p. 4, ll. 14:15–25, 15: 1–19.
The District Court ultimately affirmed the Magistrate, determining that the elective share
statute only addresses “‘quasi-community property,’ not plain old ‘community property.’” R. p.
288. The District Court further held that Carol “undoubtedly bore the burden of proving that the
[Subject Funds] constituted ‘quasi-community property’” and because Carol admittedly did not
even present evidence that the Subject Funds were quasi-community property, the “magistrate
correctly held that the elective-share statutes don’t require the return of those monies to Michael’s
estate, nor do they entitle Carol to an elective share.” R. p. 291.
As Carol’s claim to date has been strictly limited to an elective share claim, the District
Court’s ruling was similarly limited. As explained by the District Court in its Decision:
The magistrate correctly held that the elective share statutes don’t require the return
of [the Subject Funds] to Michael’s estate, nor do they entitle Carol to an elective
share. Whether those monies constitute plain old “community property,” and
whether their transfer to the Heirs and Michael’s grandchildren can be
avoided under the common law, is beyond the scope of this appeal because [it]
is beyond the scope of the petition filed and pursued by Carol and adjudicated
by the Magistrate.
R. p. 291 (emphasis added). The District Court further clarified in a footnote, “Carol simply didn’t
petition under the common law for a return of community property. Instead, Carol insisted that the
elective-share statutes were the vehicle for obtaining her fair share of both community property
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and quasi-community property.” R.

p.

291, n.

2.

Therefore, the Magistrate and the District Court

only ruled 0n the only claim raised by Carol—her elective share claim.
Carol continues to confuse concepts 0f the elective share and community property claims
before this Court. The Court will note that the ﬁrst line 0f the Statement 0f the Case in Carol’s brief
reads: “this case involves a

communitv property claim of a

her deceased husband’s estate.” Appellant’s Brief, p.

1

surviving spouse against assets 0f

(emphasis added). She mixes community

property principles into an elective share analysis even though a community property claim and

an elective share claim are

distinct

and discrete With different procedures and governing law. For

example, Carol asserts the Magistrate erred by offsetting certain portions 0f Carol’s elective share
claim, claiming “[e]ven if Michael

made

gifts t0 Carol, there is

the gifts could be offset against her share of

no authority under Idaho law

community property.” Appellant’s

Brief, p. 8.

However, the Magistrate was not addressing a community property claim because Carol
raise one. In

that

failed to

an elective share claim, offsets are a necessary consideration. See Idaho Code sections

15-2-203 and 15-2-207.
Carol’s underlying claim
share statute. Carol

mechanism

is

is

based upon a fundamental misunderstanding 0f the elective

admittedly trying t0 utilize the elective share statutes as a procedural

for her to acquire a share

of the Subject Funds that she asserts are “community

property.” However, the elective share statute provides a procedural

spouse to acquire only a share of the

The

“M-community property”

District Court provides a

thorough explanation as t0

mechanism

for a surviving

of a decedent.

Why

the elective share statutes

apply only t0 quasi-community property and not community property. This important ruling can
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be summarized with the following statement: “To be
‘quasi-community property,

’

n_ot

plain 01d ‘community property.

community property and community property
With

this clariﬁcation as to

actually argued

is

aren’t the

same

’
.

..

It is

thing.”

what Carol actually claimed (an

(community property

ruled (community property

clear, the elective share statute

is

part of elective share),

mentions only

perfectly clear that quasi-

R. pp. 288—289.

elective share),

and What the courts below actually

not part 0f elective share and Carol failed to prove her elective

share)—the arguments relative to the issues on appeal, will be more meaningful and
2.

CAROL’S FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL

Carol’s ﬁrst issue 0n appeal

is

fundamentally

Second,
is

it

ﬂawed

in three ways. First,

it

does not accurately reﬂect What the

correct that the district court erred in

quasi-community property, the issue

is

how

to

holding that the

quasi-community property.” This ﬁrst issue

raises

an argument for the ﬁrst time on appeal.

applied the

moot because

rebutted any presumption that the Subj ect Funds were

a)

district court erred in

district court actually held.

it

clear.

FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED.

IS

“Whether the

community property presumption does not apply
is

what she

Finally,

even

if

Carol

community property presumption

to

the Magistrate already found that the Heirs

community property.

Carol’s argument that the community property presumption should apply t0
quasi—community property should be disregarded by this Court because it is being
raised for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal.

Carol argues, as her ﬁrst issue 0n appeal, that “[t]he

community property presumption has n0
inaccurately implies that Carol

district court erred in

holding that the

application t0 quasi-community property.” This argument

made this argument before the lower courts. As more

fully explained

above, Carol narrowly limited her argument below to the following: the elective share statute can be
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used t0 recover community property, the Subj ect Funds are presumed to be community property, and
therefore Carol

had no burden to prove Where, When, 0r how the Subj ect Funds were acquired. Carol

never argued that the community property presumption

gm

to

quasi-community property. Carol’ s

counsel ﬂatly stated that Carol did “not claim that [the Subj ect Funds were] quasi-community
property.” Tr. p. 4,

11.

15:

1

8-19.3 Therefore, the District Court could not possibly err

apply a community property presumption t0 quasi-community property,

community property was not even
While Carol

p.

5),

failing t0

if the question

0f quasi-

at issue to Carol.

asserts before this

Idaho” (Appellant’s Brief,

by

it

Court that

is

this

argument

is

a “issue 0f ﬁrst impression in

more appropriately characterized

as a matter 0f ﬁrst

impression in this case and should therefore be rejected. “The longstanding rule of this Court
that

we

Will not consider issues that are presented for the ﬁrst time

120 Idaho 32 1 322, 8 1 5 P.2d 1061, 1062
,

(1

991).

0n appeal.” Sanchez

v.

is

Arave,

As Carol did not argue below that the community

property presumption should apply to quasi-community property, as she expressly disavowed any

such argument,
b)

it

cannot be considered for the ﬁrst time on appeal.

The District Court did, in fact, determine that the community property
presumption could apply t0 quasi—community property.

The Heirs
fundamentally

respectfully submit that Carol’s very characterization 0f her ﬁrst issue

ﬂawed because

Contrary t0 Carol’s

3

If there

brief,

it

on appeal

is

does not accurately represent an opinion of the District Court.

the District Court actually did hold that the

community property

remains any doubt 0r skepticism regarding What Carol asserted 0n appeal t0 the District Court, the Heirs ask
Reply Brief submitted t0 the District Court (R. pp. 204-34,

the Court t0 read her Appellant’s Brief and Appellant’s

268—8 1), and the

transcript 0f oral
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(Tr. pp. 1—10).

presumption could apply to quasi-community property.

The

District

Court explained that the

presumption could not apply Wholesale to quasi-community property as that would result in property
impossibly being both community property and quasi-community property

However, the

District

at the

same

time.

Court opined that the community property presumption could apply to that

portion 0f the deﬁnition 0f quasi-community property Which evaluates Whether the subject

property

would have been community property had

Therefore, Carol’s ﬁrst issue on appeal

make

failing t0

a ruling that

Even assuming

c)

it

must

fail

it

been acquired in Idaho.4 R. pp. 289—291.

as the District Court could not

have “erred” in

actually did make.

error, Carol’s

argument regarding a community property

presumption applying to quasi—community property

is

moot.

Even ifthe community property presumption somehow applies t0 quasi-community property,
Carol’s argument in this regard

would

still fail

because the Magistrate observed that the Heirs had

overcome any such community property presumption.
In

its

decision 0n Carol’s Restoration Petition, the Magistrate found that the Heirs had

“adequately rebutted the presumption that the property in question
In the Order, the Magistrate stated, “[e]ven though

elective share petition, the Heirs

4

“Quasi-community property”

acquired

by

it is

is

community property.” R.

not the Heirs” burden t0 ‘disprove’ Carol’s

went ahead and did just that. They proved with

is

deﬁned

certainty through the

as “[1] all personal property. .and all real property.

the decedent While domiciled elsewhere and

.

Which

[3]

time ofits acquisition .....
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..

[2]

would have been community

properly offhe decedent and the surviving spouse had the decedent been domiciled in
”

p. 160.

this state at the

testimony, including Carol’s testimony, that the source of the funds in the

Michael’s separate retirement beneﬁts.” R.

p.

POD

accounts had t0 be

190—91.

Carol’s argument regarding the presumption is therefore moot. If she succeeded in convincing

this

Court that the Magistrate committed reversible

would be nothing

to

be gained by remanding t0 impose a presumption

found had been overcome. “An issue
relief.

.

..”

State

v.

is

moot if.

.

.a

Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 463, 348 P.3d

77 (2015).

1,

District Court, there

that the Magistrate already

favorable judicial decision

not t0 decide moot issues. Id. Accordingly, Carol’s argument

3.

afﬁrmed by the

error, as

It is

would not result in any
the policy 0f this Court

fails.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY REFRAINING FROM RULING ON
THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY ARGUMENT.

In her second issue

Magistrate’s

rej ection

on appeal, Carol argues

that the District

Court erred by not ruling on the

of Carol’s community property argument. However, as Carol never presented

a community property claim before the Magistrate, the District Court appropriately refrained from
ruling

on a claim

that

Carol did not

had not been presented and adjudicated below.

make

a

community property

claim, she

made an

elective share claim. Carol

admitted that the only claim she had asserted was that ofher elective share. Tr. p.

community property principles,

the Magistrate considered

it

made

the Magistrate addressed Carol’s arguments 0f community property as she
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11.

18: 5- 1 8.

When

did so n_0t in the context of ruling on a

claim of community property, as such a claim or petition was never

of her elective share claim.

5,

t0 the Magistrate. Instead,

made them

in the context

The Magistrate noted that Carol had failed to prove any property was quasi-community
property and recognized that such failure was “fatal to her elective share petition.” R. p. 190. The
Magistrate then went on, “[w]hile the analysis can simply end there, the Court will address her other
arguments.” R. p. 190. Accordingly, the Magistrate was addressing the arguments Carol raised with
respect to her elective share petition, not ruling on an independent community property claim. Even
Carol admitted that the community property argument was “not an essential part” of the Magistrate’s
ruling. Tr. p. 5, ll. 19:3–4.
In fact, it was not until intermediate appeal that Carol first asserted that her community
property argument constituted a claim outside of the elective share statutes. Specifically, in her
Appellant’s Brief to the District Court, Carol argued that “[h]er claim exists independently of the
elective share statute or the Probate Code….” R. p. 211. This was the first time she had asserted
any semblance of a community property claim outside of her elective share claim.
The District Court recognized that Carol’s attempt to obtain the Subject Funds based upon a
community property argument was “beyond the scope of this appeal because it is beyond the scope
of the petition filed and pursued by Carol and adjudicated by the magistrate.” R. p. 291. The District
Court explained further that Carol “simply didn’t petition under the common law for a return of
community property. Instead, Carol insisted that the elective-share statutes were the vehicle for
obtaining her fair share of both community property and quasi-community property.” R. p. 291, n. 2.
The Heirs recognize that unpled claims may be decided by a trial court pursuant to I.R.C.P.
15(b), but that did not happen in this case. Carol’s community property claim was not tried expressly
or implicitly. Carol did not move to amend the Petition to include a common law community property
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claim. Carol did not assert that she had a community property claim independent of her elective share
claim before the Magistrate. Carol’s community property claim could not have been tried by implied
consent because Carol did not present any evidence at trial on the Petition. Accordingly, the
Magistrate could not have ruled on that claim because it had not been raised.
Contrary to her assertion, Carol is not prejudiced by the Magistrate addressing her community
property arguments. There is a significant difference between explaining that a party’s arguments are
flawed and ruling on a claim raised by a party. Here, the Magistrate addressed the community property
arguments Carol raised in the context of her elective share claim. As the District Court noted, Carol
could still make a community property claim. The fact that the Magistrate addressed the same
arguments that could be raised in that unpled claim does not prejudice that claim even if the
Magistrate’s analysis demonstrates that those arguments would not prevail.
As Carol never made an independent claim for community property before the Magistrate,
the District Court did not err by refusing to consider it on appeal. See Oregon Shortline R. Co. v. City
of Chubbuck, 93 Idaho 815, 817, 474 P.2d 244, 246 (1970) (holding that issues that are not raised in
pleadings or argued or decided by the trial court are not considered by an appellate court). The same
principle applies before this Court as well.
Alternatively, and if this Court did consider the Order to be a decision on an unpled
community property claim, probate decisions on community property versus separate property are
not appealable orders. Idaho Code section 17-201 outlines which probate orders are appealable. “The
decision whether property in a decedent’s estate is community or separate property is not one of the
judgments or orders listed in I.C. § 17-201” and therefore not an appealable order. Matter of
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Freebum’s

Estate, 97 Idaho 845, 848, 555 P.2d 385,

decision could be Viewed as determining Carol’s

388 (1976). Insomuch as the Magistrate’s

community property

claim,

it

appealable order and the District Court could not err in refraining from addressing

4.

would not be an
it.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO REWEIGH THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

Carol asks this Court t0 remand t0 the District Court so
Speciﬁcally, Carol points to her argument

on intermediate appeal

it

can reweigh the evidence.

that the “magistrate court erred in

concluding that the funds in the decedent’s accounts derived almost entirely from his retirement
account.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 7; R. p. 212. Carol conﬁrms this argument in her brief to this Court,
stating, “[a]s stated in Carol’s appellate brief t0 the district court, the

support this conclusion.” Appellant’s Brief, p.

evidence in the record does not

7.

The Magistrate found that the source 0fthe Subj ect Funds was the Decedent’s retirement. The
Magistrate noted that the Heirs “proved with certainty through the testimony, including Carol’s
testimony, that the source 0f the funds in the

As noted

benefits.” R. pp. 190—91.

POD accounts had to be Michael’s

above, this was largely based 0n Carol’s

separate retirement

own veriﬁed pleadings

and trial testimony, Which she argued on intermediate appeal could not be relied upon. The Magistrate
properly weighed the evidence and

invitation to simply

made

its

determination.

reweigh the evidence 0n appeal as

it

The

District

Court declined Carol’s

was rendered unnecessary by

the District

Court’s holding 0n the quasi-community property issue.

The
is

District Court’s decision to refrain

an inappropriate endeavor
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from reweighing the evidence could not be error as
fact, this

it

Court has noted that such a

request

is

a basis for awarding fees on appeal. See Belstler

v.

Sheler, 151 Idaho 819, 827,

264 P.3d

926, 934 (201 1) (“Normally, this Court Will award attorney fees pursuant t0 LC. § 12-121 ifthe appeal

merely invites the Court
this

t0

reweigh the evidence or second guess the lower court.

.

..”).

As

Carol asks

Court to remand to the District Court t0 reweigh the evidence, that request must be denied.
5.

THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION AS TO THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT
FUNDS WAS SUPPORTED BY LEGAL AUTHORITY.

Carol argues that the Magistrate’s View that the retirement income was “almost entirely
separate property”

was contrary t0 Idaho Code

section 32-906

and that “the magistrate court

relevant authority in support of its conclusion.” Appellant’s Brief pp. 7—8. This

is

cites

no

not accurate.

The Magistrate did, in fact, rely 0n case law supporting its View 0fthe nature ofthe Decedent’s
retirement. Carol

is

well-aware of

this.

While the

entire record is not before this Courts, there are

glimpses into the Magistrate’s legal basis with what

is

in the record.

For example, Carol

cites t0

her

Appellant’s Brief to the District Court, page 224 0f the record, in support 0f the contention that she

argued that the Magistrate “did not

was

cite

any authority for

separate property in proportion t0 the

its

number 0f years

That page includes a footnote wherein Carol admits, “[i]n

its

conclusion that the retirement income

the decedent

5

The Heirs represent that this

issue

its

prior t0 marriage.”

Decision Re: Attorney’s Fees and Costs,

the magistrate court acknowledges that ‘this Court agrees With the

535 P.2d 53 (1975)] decision and

worked

Ramsey

[v.

Ramsey, 96 Idaho 762,

application 0f a percentage rule t0 the accrual 0f retirement

was raised and addressed by the Magistrate

in subsequent ﬁlings. This Will

become

apparent below. However, Carol did not include pertinent portions 0f the record that apply t0 this argument. It should
be noted that “this Court Will presume that the absent portion supports the ﬁndings 0f the” lower court. Hansen v.
White, 163 Idaho 851,

420 P.3d 996, 1000 (2018).

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF

Page 22
|

beneﬁts.’ Decision Re: Attorney’s Fees and Costs, p. 4.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 8; R. p. 224, n.

6.

In

her reply brief t0 the District Court, Carol titled an entire section, “The magistrate court’s reliance 0n

Ramsey was misplaced.” R.

p.

278.

Therefore, Carol’ s assertion that the Magistrate did not rely on authority in making

is

belied

by her own brieﬁng 0n intermediate

appeal. Carol does not contest that basis

merely, and disingenuously, asserts the notion that the Magistrate rendered

legal basis,

6.

which

is

demonstrably

Carol argues that the District Court abused

ITS

DISCRETION

WHEN

what was presented

discretion in awarding fees under Idaho

awarding fees and

(2)

it

relies

Carol’s argument

t0 the District Court or the basis

IT

12-121.

Code

applies under the elective

a matter 0f ﬁrst impression.” This argument contains two major ﬂaws: (1)

fairly reﬂect

First,

its

community property presumption

section 12-121 because “[W]hether the

in

0n appeal, but

false.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE

is

decision

conclusion Without a

its

AWARDED FEES PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE SECTION

share statute

its

0n Which the

District

it

does not

Court relied

upon a matter of ﬁrst impression not argued before the District Court.
fails t0

take into consideration what

was

raised before the District

Court. Before the Distn'ct Court, Carol argued that the elective share statutes provide a procedural

mechanism

for a surviving spouse to recover

community property. Carol went so

far as t0 call the

Heirs’ argument to the contrary “puzzling.” R. p. 273. In fact, in response to the Heirs’ request for

attorney’s fees, Carol stated, “[t]here

statute has

no application

Court, therefore,

to

Page 23
|

n0

existing authority for the proposition that the elective share

community property claims.” R.

was not whether
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is

the

p. 281.

The

community property presumption

issue before the District

applies to quasi-community

property, but rather whether the elective share statute provides a procedural

surviving spouse t0 seek

not because she

community property. As

was arguing

for

such, the District Court

mechanism

for a

awarded fees against Carol,

an unsupportable extension of the elective share

statutes t0

community property.

The

Distn'ct

Court correctly and artfully pointed out that no part 0f the elective share statutes

included community property. See R. pp. 288—89. In exercising

65 (2019), wherein
“Doble’s argument

conduct

that.

that Carol’s

their plain

that

discretion t0

award

fees, the

Court cited Doble v. Interstate Amusements, Ina, 160 Idaho 307, 309—10, 372 P.3d 362, 364—

District

294.

its

.

.is

Court awarded attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 because

this

is

nothing more than an appeal for the courts t0 extend the law t0 include other

not fairly included in the language of the [statute].” The District Court recognized

argument

“entails stretching the language

0f Idaho’s elective-share

statutes well

beyond

meaning, so as t0 cover a subject [community property] they simply don’t cover.” R.

As Carol based

her appeal on seeking an interpretation 0f the elective share statutes to include

which the plain language did not

fees under Idaho

p.

Code

include, the District Court

was within

its

discretion t0

award

section 12421.6

Second, as noted above,

this is the ﬁrst

time that Carol

is

invoking an argument she claims

is

“of ﬁrst impression.” Carol never argued that the community property presumption should be applied
to

quasi-community property. Carol even stated that she was not claiming the Subject Funds t0 be

quasi-community property. Carol did argue for the community property presumption, but that was

6

Carol also describes her argument as an extension 0f existing law. Appellant’s Brief, p. 11. This Court in Doble

determined that a argument that the Court should interpret a statute to include that Which

argument for the extension 0f existing law. Doble, 160 Idaho
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at

309—10, 364 P.3d

at

it does not
364—65.

is

not a good faith

only t0 apply

it

to

community property she sought

the Heirs’ claim for attorney fees

on appeal showed the limited scope

community property presumption. See R.
that the elective share statute has

in the elective share.

p.

281 (“There

no application

t0

upon was not raised to

no

in

Which Carol argued the

claims.”). Accordingly, this

award 0f attorney’s fees

is

The

District

THIS

AND

to

was not an abuse of discretion.

COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL.

The Heirs request an award 0f attorney’s
12-121

community property

Court determined that the plain language 0f the statute did not allow for such an

extension and, pursuant to Doble, awarded attorney's fees. This award

7.

inapplicable because

the District Court.

In sum, Carol argued that the elective share statutes should apply to

claims.

fees

0n appeal pursuant

t0

Idaho Code sections

15-8-208, and I.A.R. 40 and 41. In reviewing this request, the Heirs ask this Court

review the journey

this

has been.

Carol ﬁled her Petition. Despite the language 0f the comments t0 the statute that

burden t0 prove

all

elements 0f her claim,7 Carol presented n0 evidence

the elective share included

applied.

community property

The Magistrate found

to

at trial.

7

what

it

it

was her

She argued

that

which a community property presumption

that Carol did not carry her

burden in any way. The Heirs sought

an award 0f fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. The Magistrate exercised
in

against

existing authority for the proposition

community property

assertion of ﬁrst impression t0 bar the Distn'ct Court’s

the issue relied

is

Even her argument

its

discretion,

considered “a very close call,” and denied the request. R. p. 285.

See Idaho Code section 15-2-201,

Comment t0

Ofﬁcial Text, “The surviving spouse rather than the executor 0r the

probate court has the burden 0f asserting an election, as well as the burden 0f proving the matters Which must be

shown

in order t0

make

a successful claim t0
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more than he 0r she has received.”

On appeal, Carol continued to argue that the elective share statutes included community
property. Carol confirmed that she had only sought the Subject Funds by way of an elective share
and that she did not claim that the Subject Funds were quasi-community property. The District
Court explained that the elective share statutes only included quasi-community property and not
community property and explained that Carol’s vehicle for seeking the Subject Funds under a
community property argument was improper. The District Court exercised its discretion in favor
of awarding fees to the Heirs, recognizing that Carol’s appeal attempted to stretch the language of
the statutes to include that which they do not. R. p. 294.
Despite the District Court’s instructions on how to properly pursue a community property
claim and its thorough explanation that the elective share statutes do not encompass community
property claims, Carol appealed to this Court. In her appeal, she is mischaracterizing the decisions
of the courts below and asserting issues for the first time. She asserts, incorrectly, that the District
Court failed to hold that the community property presumption has no application to quasicommunity property—even though Carol never argued as much to the District Court and admitted
to the District Court that she was not claiming the Subject Funds to be quasi-community property.
Additionally, she assigns error to the District Court for not addressing a claim (common law
community property claim) that she never made to the Magistrate and is not part of her Petition,
which is the subject of this appeal.
Carol’s appeal here is a continuation of her ignoring the plain language of the elective share
statutes, which, pursuant to Doble (which the District Court cited to in awarding fees), provides a
basis for attorney’s fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. Carol’s changing positions do not save
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her appeal from being subject to Idaho Code section 12-121. Even if an appellant raises new issues
on appeal that could be valid, this Court cannot consider them and they cannot be the basis to
legitimize an otherwise frivolous appeal. See Kinsela v. State, Dept. of Finance, 117 Idaho 632,
635–36, 790 P.2d 1388, 1391–92 (1990) (holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal are
not considered, however meritorious, in an award of fees under Idaho Code section 12-121).
As Carol’s appeal (1) is based upon an argument to extend clear statutes to issues not
covered therein; (2) relies upon mischaracterized rulings of the lower courts; (3) raises new issues
on this subsequent appeal; and (4) asks this Court to force the District Court to reweigh the
evidence, her appeal is frivolous and fees should be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code section 12121.
Alternatively, the Heirs request costs and attorney fees from Carol, personally, pursuant to
Idaho Code section 15-8-208. That Section provides:
(1) Either the district court or the court on appeal may, in its discretion,
order costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, to be awarded to any party:
(a) From any party to the proceedings;
(b) From the assets of the estate or trust involved in the proceedings; or
(c) From any nonprobate asset that is the subject of the proceedings. The
court may order the costs to be paid in such amount and in such manner as the court
determines to be equitable.
(2) This section applies to all proceedings governed by this chapter
including, but not limited to, proceedings involving trusts, decedent’s estates and
properties, and guardianship matters. Except as provided in section 12-117, for the
payment of costs, this section shall not be construed as being limited by any other
specific statutory provision providing for the payment of costs, unless such statute
specifically provides otherwise.
This matter falls within this section as it pertains to the Decedent’s probate, which is an
estate proceeding. As such, this Court has discretion, as it determines to be equitable, to make an
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award of costs and

fees

from any party to the proceeding to another party. Due

nature 0f Carol’s claims presented

below and on appeal,

this

to the questionable

Court should award fees to the Heirs.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons
District

set forth

above, the Heirs respectﬁllly request that this Court afﬁrm the

Court and award the Heirs fees and costs 0n appeal.

DATED this 215‘ day of August,

2019.
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